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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
in Tyler should help clarify that fees and expenses recoverable under the Act
include costs associated with agency proceedings as well as costs associated
with subsequent civil litigation. 2 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Tyler should
also serve as a warning to administrative agencies not to pursue litigation unless
their claim against a party is substantially justified in law or fact. 3
STUART RoBIN KAPLAN
II. ADMIRALTY
Seamen's Wage Compensation: Effect of
Discharge Justification Provision in
Improper Discharge Statute
Section 594 of Title 46 of the United States Code provides wage compen-
sation under specific circumstances to any seaman improperly discharged from
employment.' Section 594 compensation consists of one month's regular wages
in addition to any wages the seaman may have earned before his discharge.'
To recover under section 594, a claimant seaman must satisfy three
82. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted Act
to focus on government's position at whatever level of proceeding a party seeks to recover fees).
83. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (Congress passed Act to encourage individuals
to resist unreasonable governmental actions).
1. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976) (original version at ch. 322, § 21, 17 Stat. 266 (1872)). Section
594 states that any seaman signed on to a vessel for a voyage who is discharged prior to that
voyage or prior to earning one month's wages, without the seaman's consent and without fault
on his part justifying such discharge, may recover from the shipmaster or shipowner those wages
the seaman already earned before his decharge plus the equivalent of one month's wages as com-
pensation. Id. A discharge is improper if the discharge is an unjustified breach of the seaman's
shipping articles or contractual agreement. United States Steel Products Co. v. Adams (The Steel
Trader), 275 U.S. 388, 392 (1928); see Newton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 180 F.2d 491, 494 (3d Cir.)
(discharge of crew after two weeks of three month contract constitutes improper discharge), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Sergeant v. The 0. M. Bernuth, 122 F. Supp. 589, 592 (S.D. Tex.
1954) (early discharge of crew at port not stipulated in shipping articles constitutes improper
discharge), aff'd, 217 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1955); cf. Manetas v. International Petroleum Carriers,
Inc., 541 F.2d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 1976) (shipowner's discharge of crew because ship unable to
continue voyage due to unseaworthy condition of vessel constitutes justifiable discharge); Kor-
thinos v. The Niarchos, 175 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir.) (refusal of crew to perform duties and pro-
test strike by crew grounds for proper discharge), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 894 (1949); Fiamengo
v. The San Francisco, 172 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir.) (disobedience of crewmembers grounds for
proper discharge), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 946 (1949); The S. J. Wilder, 284 F. 728, 728 (S.D.
Ala. 1921) (discharge of seaman for unsatisfactory performance and insubordination is proper
discharge), aff'd, 284 F. 729 (5th Cir. 1922).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976); see supra note I (text of § 594).
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requirements. 3 The seaman's discharge must occur prior to the commence-
ment of the seaman's first voyage or before the seaman earned one month's
wages.4 In addition, signed shipping articles must govern the seaman's terms
of employment.' Finally, the seaman's discharge must not be a result of fault
on the seaman's part and must be without the seaman's consent. 6 A primary
issue concerning the fault clause is whether a seaman must be blameless before
he may recover for early discharge against the shipmaster or shipowner.' In
Neathery v. M/V Overseas Marilyn,' the Fourth Circuit considered whether
a seaman's fault proximately caused by an initial fault on the part of the
shipowner barred the seaman's recovery under section 594 for improper
discharge. 9
Neathery, a merchant seaman, signed shipping articles for work aboard
the vessel Overseas Marilyn for a voyage between Norfolk, Virginia and the
Netherlands.'I Neathery, however, failed to join the Overseas Marilyn in time
for the vessel's departure, resulting in Neathery's constructive discharge."
3. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 4-6 (listing requirements
for § 594 recovery).
4. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976); see supra note I (text of § 594).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976); see supra note 1 (text of § 594). Federal law requires each
seaman employed aboard a vessel bound for a foreign port to sign shipping articles with the
shipowner's agents. 1B BENEDICT ON ADMAHILUY § 62, at 5-3 (7th ed. 1982); see 46 U.S.C. §
564 (1976) (requirements governing nature and content of shipping articles). Each seaman's ship-
ping articles represent an individual contract of employment with the shipmaster. Bunn v. Global
Marine, Inc., 428 F.2d 40, 46 (5th Cir. 1970). Shipping articles bind the shipmaster individually
as well as the ship and the ship's owner. Aird v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 169 F.2d 606, 609
(3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949). Both the shipowner and shipmaster are liable
for a seaman's wrongful discharge under § 594. Id.; see 46 U.S.C. §594 (1976). See generally
I NORM, THE LAW oF SEAMEN § 299 (3d ed. 1970) (discussion of Liability for seamen's wages).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1976); see supra note 1 (text of § 594).
7. See Davis v. Delta S.S. Co., 704 F.2d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 1983) (interpreting § 594 to
bar seaman's recovery if seaman in any manner at fault); Zimbro v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 1954
A.M.C. 1909, 1911 (E.D. La. 1954) (same). But see The Villa y Herman, 101 F. 132, 133 (S.D.
Ala. 1900) (single fault on part of seaman not grounds for discharge unless degree of fault justifies
discharge). See supra note 5 (Both shipowner and shipmaster liable for seaman's wrongful discharge).
8. 700 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 143.
10. Id. at 141.
11. Id. After standing watch aboard the Overseas Marilyn at Norfolk, the plaintiff Neathery,
in Neathery v. M/V Overseas M arilyn, went ashore at 4 p.m. on March 11, 1981 to visit his
family. Id. Neathery returned to his ship at 7 p.m., an hour before the posted sailing time, to
discover that the shipowner's agents had delayed the sailing time by seven hours to 3 a.m. Id.
In addition, the agents had scheduled a 10:30 p.m. shift from the Norfolk pier to pier 15 at
Newport News. Id. Neathery returned home, expecting to meet the ship at Newport News at
2 a.m. and sail at the scheduled 3 a.m. departure time. Id.; see Brief for Appellant at 4, Neathery
v. M/V Overseas Marilyn, 700 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1983) (detailing Neathery's plans to meet vessel
at Newport News) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. While Neathery was on shore, the
shipowner's agents changed the sailing time again, announcing departure from Norfolk for off-
shore anchorage at midnight and cancelling the shift to Newport News. 700 F.2d at 141. Conse-
quently, when Neathery reported to pier 15 at Newport News between 1 and 1:30 a.m., the ship
was not alongside. Id.; see Brief for Appellant at 4, supra (specifying exact time of Neathery's
1984]
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Neathery filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia claiming wage compensation under section 594. 2 The district
court determined that the shipowner's agents breached Neathery's employ-
ment contract by failing to post timely notice of the vessel's departure.' 3 The
court, however, also determined that Neathery was negligent in not taking
adequate steps to locate the Overseas Marilyn before its departure." The court
interpreted section 594 to require the seaman claiming compensation to be
completely without fault. 15 The district court therefore concluded that
Neathery's negligence barred any entitlement to section 594 relief.
16
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, con-
cluding that the district court improperly interpreted and applied section 594. 17
The Neathery court recognized that the district court failed to consider whether
Neathery's conduct justified his discharge. 8 The Fourth Circuit noted that
the express language of section 594 bars compensation to a discharged seaman
only if the seaman's fault justified his discharge. 9 The Neathery court refer-
red to the remedial purpose of section 594 to support the interpretation of
arrival at pier 15). Neathery failed to locate the ship in time for its actual departure for the
Netherlands. 700 F.2d at 141; see infra note 14 (Neathery's attempts to locate vessel). Both Neathery
and the shipowner agreed that Neathery's failure to sail with the Overseas Marilyn constituted
the reason for Neathery's discharge. 700 F.2d at 143; see 1 NoRis, supra note 5, § 467, at 549-50
(discussing effects of seaman's failure to join vessel in time for departure).
A labor management agreement governed Neathery's shipping articles and provided that posting
of the ship's sailing time would occur at least eight hours before departure. 700 F.2d at 141.
The agreement further stipulated that if the shipowner's agents scheduled departure for between
midnight and 8 a.m., the agents would make the announcement no later than 5 p.m. Id. Evidence
indicated that both the first and second sailing time changes occurred after 5 p.m., in contraven-
tion of the labor management agreement. Id.
12. Id. at 140, 142. Neathery's original complaint advanced both 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1958)
and general maritime employment contract principles as theories of recovery. Id. at 142. The
Fourth Circuit did not consider Neathery's second theory because the court's rejection of Neathery's
§ 594 claim was determinative of the case. Id. at 144.
13. Id. at 141, 142.
14. Id. at 143 n.2. Neathery arrived at pier 15 in Newport News and discovered that the
Overseas Marilyn was not there. Id. at 141. Neathery had the pier manager at Newport News
telephone the Virginia State Pilots' office concerning the whereabouts of the vessel, but the Pilots'
office erroneously informed the pier manager that the Overseas Marilyn had already sailed for
Europe. Id. Later, Neathery called the ship's tug company, which informed Neathery that the
ship was no longer at its pier in Norfolk. Id. Neathery made no further attempts to locate the
ship. Id. The shipowner's agents had hired a taxi company and a launch company to locate and
transport to the Overseas Marilyn any seamen, unaware of the sailing changes, waiting at pier
15 in Newport News. Id. The taxi company sent two cabs, which waited for crew members at
pier 14 rather than pier 15. Id. Neathery claimed that he did not see these cabs because machinery
obstructed the view between piers 14 and 15. Id. at 141-42.
15. Id. at 143.
16. Id. at 142. The district court in Neathery utilized a contributory negligence inquiry.
See id. at 143 n.3. The Fourth Circuit suggested, however, that application of a contractual breach
theory, and not a tort theory, was the correct approach to the Neathery § 594 issue. See id. at 142-43.
17. Id. at 143.
18. Id.; see supra note 1 (text of § 594).
19. 700 F.2d at 143.
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the statute."0 The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court's interpretation
of section 594 countered the statute's remedial purpose by placing on the
seaman the burden of mitigating all possible ill effects resulting from a
shipowner's initial breach of contract leading to subsequent fault on the
seaman's part.I' The Neathery court subsequently reevaluated the factual and
legal conclusions of the district court and determined that while Neathery could
have employed more effective means to locate the Overseas Marilyn, Neathery's
actions were not sufficiently incompetent to justify his constructive discharge.
2
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the shipowner improperly discharged Neathery,
thereby entitling Neathery to compensation for lost wages on the terms of
section 594.23
The Neathery court's interpretation of section 594 is consistent with federal
20. Id. at 142, 144; see infra note 24 (discussion of remedial purpose of § 594).
21. 700 F.2d at 144.
22. Id. In response to the shipowner's attempts to erase any fault on its part, the district
court in Neathery recognized that changes in sailing times in violation of Neathery's labor manage-
ment agreement constituted a breach of contract by the shipowner's agents. Id. The court, however,
ruled that efforts by the agents to locate crewmen still ashore at least partially cured the breach.
Id.; see supra note 14 (discussion of shipowner's agents' attempts to locate crewmen). The Fourth
Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion, suggesting that the means of locating missing seamen
used by the shipowner's agents was inadequate due to the agents' failure to find Neathery at
pier 15 where he was waiting. 700 F.2d at 144; see supra note 14 (discussion of Neathery's attempts
to locate vessel).
In Neathery, the Fourth Circuit avoided a controversial procedural issue arising on review
of the district court's finding of negligence on Neathery's part. See id. at 143 n.2 (Fourth Cir-
cuit's discussion of rule 52(a) problem). Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure man-
dates that, in non-jury trials, reviewing courts should not set aside a district court's findings
of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a). A number of circuits
consider a trial court's finding of negligence a finding of fact, and therefore such a finding is
final on appeal unless the trial courts' conclusion of negligence is clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,
Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 645 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1981) (questions of negligence
are questions of fact and thus not reviewable unless clearly erroneous); Marcona Corp. v. Oil
Screw Shifty III, 615 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1980) (in non-jury admiralty proceeding, courts
should treat questions of negligence as questions of fact); Glenview Park Dist. v. Melhus, 540
F.2d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976) (Rule 52(a) governs review of trial court's findings of negligence
in admiralty trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Sines v. United States, 430 F.2d 644, 644-45
(9th Cir. 1970) (lower court's finding of negligence is factual finding not reviewable on appeal
unless clearly erroneous). But see Cleary v. United States Lines, Co., 411 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d
Cir. 1969) (finding of negligence reviewable as matter of law but ordinarily will stand unless
lower court manifests incorrect conception of applicable law); Olah v. S. S. Jaladurga, 343 F.2d
457, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1965) (district court's determination of negligence is question of law upon
which reviewing courts must apply independent judgment).
The Neathery court recognized that the district court ruling disqualifying Neathery from
§ 594 compensation due to his negligence was not a purely factual finding but involved the
application of law to facts. See 700 F.2d at 143 n.2 (district court based conclusions of negligence
not on findings of fact but on determination that plaintiff's attempts to locate vessel were so
inept as to constitute negligence). The Fourth Circuit did not overturn the district court's finding
of negligence, but rather, re-evaluated the legal effect of Neathery's attempts to locate the vessel.
Id. at 144.
23. 700 F.2d at 144.
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standards for application of protective statutes like section 594.24 The Supreme
Court has construed section 594 as a remedial, rather than a punitive, statute
designed to compensate a seaman for loss of expected wages after an improper
discharge that constitutes a breach of shipping articles. 25 Additionally, in Vla-
vianos v. The Cypress,26 the Fourth Circuit considered the protective nature
of section 594 and determined that, in view of the statute's remedial purpose,
courts should construe section 594 liberally in favor of the seaman." Likewise,
in Bunn v. Global Marine, Inc.,2" the Fifth Circuit noted that section 594
24. See id. at 142, 144 (Neathery court's analysis of Neathery's conduct and interests under
§ 594 in view of protective nature of § 594); infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussion
of decisions interpreting § 594 to favor seamen's interests).
Section 594 complements a group of statutes providing seamen special rights and remedies.
See 46 U.S.C. §§ 564, 565, 567, 568 (1976) (seamen's shipping articles requirements); id. §§ 592-94,
596, 597, 600, 601, 604 (seamen's wage regulations); id. §§ 660-1, 665-67, 669, 673, 678, 688,
712 (seamen's protection and relief for personal injury and distress); see also Bunn v. Global
Marine, Inc., 428 F.2d 40, 45 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 594 is one of number of federal statutes protec-
ting seamen); infra note 28 (discussion of Bunn decision). Congress enacted these statutes upon
the theory that seamen needed special legislative protection. See Arwine v. Alaska S. S. Co. (The
Nizina), 189 Wash. 437, 440, 65 P.2d 695, 697 (1937) (seamen's wage statutes intended to protect
seamen and thus warrant liberal construction). The special protection accorded seamen derives
from the concept that seamen are wards of admiralty, a concept that remains a current doctrine.
See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942) (merchant seamen are
wards of admiralty); Lampsis Navigation, Ltd. v. Ortiz de Cortes, 694 F.2d 936, 936 (2d Cir.
1982) (as wards of admiralty, legislation provides seamen special protection under admiralty law),
In re Jama, 436 F. Supp. 963, 965 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (as wards of admiralty, seamen require
special safeguards for their health and welfare). See generally Norris, The Seaman As Ward of
the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. Rnv. 479, 479-80, 491-93 (1954) (general discussion of ward of ad-
miralty characterization and legislative enactments governing seamen's special rights).
25. See United States Steel Products Co. v. Adams (The Steel Trader), 275 U.S. 388, 392
(1928) (construing R.S. § 4527, predecessor to § 594, as remedial statute). In The Steel Trader,
the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended § 4527 to provide seamen with a means
of establishing and enforcing damages for an improper discharge in breach of the seaman's con-
tract of employment. Id. at 391-92. The Court noted that an employer's breach of a seaman's
contract was an invasion of a seaman's rights, and that for an invasion of a particular right,
an appropriate remedy exists. Id. at 391. The Steel Trader Court defined the appropriate remedy
as compensation, and concluded that § 4527, as a compensatory statute,was remedial in nature.
Id. at 392. The Steel Trader Court, however, did not mandate explicitly a liberal construction
of § 4527 in ruling that the statute was remedial. See id.
26. 171 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 924 (1949). In Vlavianos, the Fourth
Circuit considered the § 594 compensation claim of a group of crew members discharged prior
to a voyage, although the seamen's contracts made payment of wages contingent on actual com-
pletion of the planned voyage. Id. at 438-39. The Vlavianos court reversed the district court rul-
ing that § 594 was inapplicable to lump sum agreements. Id. at 439. The Vlavianos court deter-
mined that § 594 does not distinguish between periodic wage payment contracts and lump sum
payment contracts. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that because § 594 does not distinguish between
wage payment methods in providing a one month wage remedy, the court would construe § 594
liberally in view of the statute's remedial purpose to allow the claimant seamen one month's
wages at a customary rate rather than to preclude recovery altogether. Id.; see supra note 1 (text
of § 594).
27. 171 F.2d at 439.
28. 428 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970). In Bunn v. Global Marine, Inc., the claimant seaman,
a ship's cook, signed aboard the Glomar Challenger through an individual employment contract
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is one of a number of federal statutes designed to give seamen, as wards of
admiralty, 29 unusual rights and remedies with respect to wages.3 0 The Bunn
court suggested that because section 594 is a remedial statute, courts should
construe the terms of the statute broadly to produce a reasonable result
beneficial to the seaman."
The early decisions of a number of courts determining section 594 issues
involving discharge justification reflect the flexible application of the statute
suggested in Vavianos and Bunn.32 In Trent v. Gulf Pacific Lines,3 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas considered the case
of a seaman discharged by the shipmaster after the seaman refused to comply
with the shipmaster's order .3 The seaman claimed compensation under sec-
tion 594 on the grounds that his insubordination did not justify his discharge.
3S
The district court determined that the seaman had engaged in conduct subject
to discipline but found the shipmaster at fault for failing to maintain a proper
air of authority on board the vessel. 36 The court noted that the shipmaster's
fault -was the major factor contributing to the seaman's insubordination.
37
The Trent court concluded that, in light of the shipmaster's fault, the seaman's
conduct did not justify his discharge. 38 The Trent court thus permitted the
seaman to receive section 594 compensation for wrongful discharge. 39
In The Alice Blanchard,"° the United States District Court for the Northern
for two 60-day legs of the vessel's trial voyage. Id. at 44. The shipmaster discharged Bunn without
justification more than one month into Bunn's term of employment. Id. at 43. At trial, the shipowner
sought to apply § 594 against Bunn, thereby limiting him to one month's wages when the employ-
ment contract actually entitled Bunn to at least four month's wages. Id. The Bunn court ruled
that to apply § 594 to limit Bunn's recovery would produce an unreasonable result. Id. In addi-
tion, the Bunn court noted that courts should not apply a remedial statute like § 594 to the
substantial disadvantage of a member of the class for whose especial benefit Congress designed
the statute. Id. The Fifth Circuit subsequently determined that, under the circumstances, applica-
tion of § 594 would not advance the remedial purposes of the statute, and awarded Bunn four
month's wages under the employment contract rather than the one month's wages recoverable
under § 594. Id. at 47-48.
29. See supra note 24 (discussion of seamen as wards of admiralty).
30. 428 F.2d at 45.
31. Id. at 47.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 33-51 and notes 33, 44 & 51 (cases applying § 594
with emphasis on justification clause); supra text accompanying notes 26-31 and notes 26 & 28
(Vlavianos and Bunn courts suggest liberal application of § 594).
33. 42 F.2d 903 (S.D. Tex. 1930). In Trent v. Gulf Pacific Lines, the shipmaster ordered
the ship's cook to hand over the keys to the freezer room, but the cook refused to follow the
order. Id. at 903. The shipmaster madt no further attempts to enforce his order, and instead
decided to discharge the cook after the cook's disobedience to the initial order. Id. In determin-
ing that the cook was entitled to § 594 compensation, the Trent court noted that a shipmaster
cannot discharge crew members for any minor infraction of discipline. Id. at 904.
34. Id. at 903.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 903-904.
37. Id. at 904.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 92 F. 519 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
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District of California likewise considered a discharge justification issue. 4' In
The Alice Blanchard, a seaman signed articles requiring the seaman to report
for duty on a specific day.42 The shipping articles, however, did not specify
any particular hour on that day as the reporting time. 43 The shipmaster ordered
the seaman to report at a certain hour, but the seaman did not join the vessel
until after the specified time. 44 The shipmaster discharged the seaman and
the seaman subsequently claimed compensation for improper discharge. 45 The
district court held that the seaman substantially complied with the shipping
articles in reporting for work on the day specified.46 The court suggested that
if the shipmaster required his seamen to report at a particular hour, then the
shipmaster should have included that provision in the seamen's articles.47 The
Alice Blanchard court concluded that the shipmaster was not justified in
discharging the seaman and awarded wage compensation. 4
The Trent and The Alice Blanchard decisions suggest that justification
for a seaman's discharge is necessary before a seaman is barred from section
594 recovery. 49 These cases thus implied that the mere fact that the seaman
41. Id. at 520.
42. Id. at 519.
43. Id.
44. Id. In The Alice Blanchard, the shipmaster orally ordered the claimant seaman, the
ship's cook, to be on board in time to prepare breakfast. Id. The cook replied that he probably
could not join the vessel at that early time. Id. The shipmaster warned the cook that if the cook
was not on board by breakfast time, the shipmaster would discharge the cook. Id.
45. Id. at 520.
46. Id. at 521.
47. Id. at 520.
48. Id. at 521.
49. See Trent v. Gulf Pacific Lines, 42 F.2d 903, 904 (S.D. Tex. 1930) (shipmaster cannot
discharge crewmembers for any slight infraction of discipline); supra note 33 and text accom-
panying notes 33-39 (discussion of Trent decision); The Alice Blanchard, 92 F. 519, 521 (N.D.
Cal. 1899) (seaman's fault not justification for discharge under totality of circumstances); supra
text accompanying notes 40-48 (discussion of The Alice Blanchard decision); accord The Kentra,
286 F. 163, 164 (E.D. N.Y. 1922) (seaman's fault not justification for discharge in light of ship-
master's breach of shipping articles); infra note 51 (discussion of The Kentra decision); see also
The Villa y Herman, 101 F. 132, 133 (S.D. Ala. 1900) (seaman's discharge not justified unless
seaman's fault is highly aggravated); The Topgallant, 84 F. 356, 357 (D. Wash. 1898) (seaman's
fault must justify his discharge); The Idlehour, 63 F. 1018, 1019 (N.D.N.Y. 1894) (same); Marsland
v. The Yosemite, 18 F. 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (single fault on part of seaman not justification
for discharge without compensation).
In enacting § 594, the United States adoped § 167 of the British Merchant Shipping Act
of 1854 with minor changes as considered necessary for adaptation to American admiralty law.
1B BENEDICT, supra note 5, § 65, at 5-15; see 11 TEMPERLEY, BRnsH SHIPPING LAWS § 162,
302, at 111-12 (6th ed. 1963) (text of British Merchant Shipping Act); ch. 322, § 21, 17 Stat.
266 (1873) (text of original version of § 594). Commentary on the English version of § 594 em-
phasizes that mere proof of a seaman's negligence is not enough to warrant a discharge without
compensation. 11 TEMPERLEY, supra, § 162, 303 n.4, at 112. Temperley, in support of its em-
phasis on the justification provision in the improper discharge statute, cited two early cases upon
which Parliament based the statute. See id.; The Blake, 166 Eng. Rep. 500 (1839) (deciding seaman's
wage claim after discharge); The Exeter, 165 Eng. Rep. 309 (1799) (determining degree of seaman's
act necessary to justify discharge). In The Exeter, the English High Court of Admiralty ruled
[Vol. 41:491
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was at fault was not per se justification for the seaman's discharge." Like
the Neathery court, the Trent and The Alice Blanchard courts determined that
a single fault on the part of a seaman was not sufficient to justify the seaman's
discharge when the seaman's improper conduct was the reasonable result of
the shipmaster's or shipowner's initial fault."
In Davis v. Delta Steamship Co.,52 however, the Fifth Circuit reached
a different result when the court considered a seaman's discharge resulting
from the seaman's fault alone. 3 In Davis, the shipmaster discharged the
seaman, a ship's officer, when the seaman went ashore to purchase naviga-
tional aids after being denied authorization to leave the vessel .5 The district
court determined that because the seaman failed to prove that his discharge
was improper, the seaman's fault barred him from section 594 compensation.
55
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the seaman claimed that his fault was too
minor to justify his discharge.5 The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to recon-
that a single act committed in port is not conclusive proof of fault justifying discharge, and
that acts justifying discharge must amount to habitual inattention to the ordinary duties of the
seaman. 165 Eng. Rep. at 310. The High Court of Admiralty in The Blake held that a shipmaster
could not withhold wages in cases of discharge for misconduct not of a nature rendering discharge
absolutely necessary to preserve the safety of the vessel. 166 Eng. Rep. at 501.
50. See supra note 49 (cases discussing requirement for justification of discharge).
51. See 700 F.2d at 144 (initial breach of contract by shipowner's agents caused seaman's
failure to join vessel, thus allowing seaman § 594 recovery); Trent v. Gulf Pacific Lines, 42 F.2d
903, 904 (S.D. Tex. 1930) (shipmaster's fault proximate cause of seaman's fault, and thus seaman's
discharge not justified); The Alice Blanchard, 92 F. 519, 521 (N.D. Cal. 1899) (shipmaster's failure
to provide certain terms in shipping articles resulted in seaman's fault, and thus seaman's discharge
not justified); accord The Kentra, 286 F. 163, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1922) (shipmaster's breach of ar-
ticles proximate cause of seaman's fault, and thus seaman's discharge not justified). In The Ken-
ira, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the § 594
claim of a seaman discharged after the seaman refused to proceed with the vessel's planned voyage.
286 F. at 164. The seaman's shipping articles contained a clause empowering the shipmaster to
order the'vessel to sail to any port in the world. Id. In 1915, the shipmaster announced that
the vessel would travel into the European war zone. Id. at 164. The seaman refused to proceed
with the voyage on the basis of the vessel's sailing plans and received a discharge. Id. The seaman
claimed § 594 compensation, arguing that the vessel's entry into European waters during a state
of war constituted a breach of the seaman's shipping articles, since at the time the parties signed
the articles, neither party had contemplated the possibility of war. Id. The district court agreed
with the seaman and held that the seaman's refusal to sail with the ship into the war zone did
not disqualify him from § 594 recovery due to the initial breach of the shipping articles by the
shipmaster. Id.
52. 704 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 764.
54. Id. at 763. In Davis v. Delta S.S. Co., the claimant seaman had orders to complete
a log book for the voyage just completed. Id. The seaman asked the chief mate for permission
to go ashore to purchase navigational aids. Id. The chief mate told the seaman that the seaman
had to complete the log book before he could go ashore. Id. The seaman went ashore without
first completing his work aboard the vessel and consequently received a discharge. Id. In addi-
tion, the evidence presented at trial indicated that the means by which the seaman obtained the
navigational aids was improper and unauthorized. Id.
55. Id. In Davis, the district court found that Davis had disobeyed an order. Id. at 763.
The district judge determined that disobedience is a justification for discharge. Id.
56. Id.
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sider the district court's decision because the district judge's finding of fault
on the seaman's part was not clearly erroneous.7 Thus, the Fifth Circuit sanc-
tioned a section 594 interpretation barring wage compensation whenever the
seaman's fault occasioned his discharge, with no consideration of whether the
fault in fact justified the discharge. 8
Like Davis, most section 594 actions involve a discharge resulting from
either the seaman's fault or the shipowner's fault. 9 Neathery, however, in-
volved a complex set of facts leading to a trial court determination that the
shipowner and the seaman were mutually at fault."0 Because Neathery involved
mutual fault, the Fourth Circuit necessarily compared the conduct of both
parties, with the remedial purpose of section 594 as a major consideration. 6'
Presented with a seaman's claim under a statute requiring liberal application
in favor of seamen, the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted and applied sec-
tion 594 to allow a seaman the greatest benefit possible within the express
wording of the statute. 62 Accordingly, the Neathery court determined that,
in a mutual fault situation, a seaman's fault must be sufficiently serious to
justify his discharge before that fault acts to bar section 594 compensation.
63
Cases involving seamen's fault alone arguably may not fall within the
Neathery ruling, particularly considering the Fifth Circuit's Davis decision. 4
Nonetheless, the decisions of a number of courts declaring that minor fault
is not per se justification for discharge are significant.65 Thus a likelihood
exists that the Neathery decision will affect not only accidental discharges like
that in Neathery but discharges resulting from negligence or insubordination
on the part of the seaman alone. 6 The Fourth Circuit decided Neathery
primarily on the basis of the express wording of section 594, which requires
justification for a seaman's discharge. 67 Based on the Neathery court's statutory
57. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (reviewing court should not set aside trial judge's find-
ings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous); supra note 22 (discussion of rule 52(a)).
58. 704 F.2d at 764 (practical effect of Davis judgment precludes inquiry into whether
seaman's fault justifies discharge); supra note 1 (cases demonstrating that proper or improper
discharge contingent upon breach of articles by either seamen or shipmaster); supra text accom-
panying notes 52-58 (discussion of Davis decision).
60. See 700 F.2d at 141, 142 (discussion of facts and trial court decision in Neathery).
61. See 700 F.2d at 144 (Neathery court's evaluation of seaman's conduct and ramifica-
tions of district court decision in view of remedial purpose of § 594); supra note 24 (discussion
of protective nature of § 594).
62. See 700 F.2d at 144 (Neathery decision requiring seaman's fault to justify discharge);
supra note 1 (text of § 594); supra note 24 (discussion of protective nature of § 594).
63. 700 F.2d at 144.
64. See 704 F.2d at 764 (Davis holding that action for wages under § 594 requires seaman
to prove absence of fault in his discharge); supra text accompanying 52-58 (discussion of Davis
decision).
65. See supra note 49 (discussion of cases and authorities requiring justification for discharge
in § 594 proceedings).
66. See 700 F.2d at 141 (Neathery court's characterization of case facts as comedy of errors);
supra note 1 (cases involving fault of seaman alone in justifiable discharge situations).
67. See 700 F.2d at 143 (Neathery court's determination that district court misinterpreted
§ 594); supra text accompanying notes 17-19 (Neathery decision and Fourth Circuit's reasoning);
supra note 1 (text of § 594).
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